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Abstract 
Translation theorists have so far devoted scant attention to the translation of 
philosophical texts. The author of the present article, drawing on his own 
experience in the translation of two books of philosophy, attempts to illustrate 
some of the typical problems found in this field. Two kinds of problems are 
identified: the  use of technical terms, often of the philosopher’s own  invention, 
which may be almost untranslatable, and the difficulties inherent in the use of a 
literary, metaphorical language, with all the consequent ambiguity and stylistic 
questions involved. The terminological problems are illustrated by reference to 
the translation of a book on Aristotle, while the literary issues are illustrated by 
reference to a text. 
 
 
The translation of philosophical texts has received relatively little attention in 
the literature on translation theory, although there are some classic statements 
by Renaissance writers and a few scattered articles or remarks in more recent 
theorists (see, for example, Gill 1998). This paper aims to make a modest 
contribution to the discussion, opening up a few issues with reference to two 
books translated by this author from Italian into English in recent years: Natali’s 
La saggezza di Aristotele, and Cristin’s Heidegger e Leibniz: Il sentiero e la 
ragione. 
The translation of philosophical texts may first of all be quite clearly 
separated from that regarding the mass of what are called technical texts. 
Although philosophical texts do use a kind of technical terminology, or even 
jargon at times, they cannot be classed together with strictly technical texts such 
as those of medicine, law or engineering. Philosophers frequently invent their 
own terms, or assign new meanings to old terms, or use ordinary words in a 
new, technical sense, etc. All of this means that the translator has to pay very 
close attention to the author’s words, comparing and contrasting the different 
uses of one and the same word in different contexts. Philosophers also use many 
literary devices, and indeed some philosophical works have attained the status 
of great literature (the dialogues of Plato, for example, or More’s Utopia; in 
modern times, one of the most ‘literary’ philosophers is Santayana, but one 
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should also mention Sartre and Camus). The translator must therefore also be 
prepared to face literary and rhetorical passages when they occur. The upshot is 
that the translator has to deal adequately with a text that may be partly technical 
(sometimes even quite technical, with formulas and all – as in essays on formal 
logic) and sometimes literary or even poetical (philosophical texts in verse are a 
special category, of which the most notable example is Lucretius’ De Rerum 
Natura). 
Let us now turn to examine the problems posed by the two books in 
question. 
Aristotle’s words 
The Penguin translator of Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric begins his introduction 
with these words: 
 
The translation of Aristotle must be reckoned amongst the greatest, but 
also amongst the driest, of the pleasures that the study of the Classics 
affords the scholar. There is hardly a paragraph that he wrote which does 
not contain some stimulating or arresting thought, some consideration of 
a familiar problem from a new perspective, or some fruitful discovery of 
a new problem where all previously seemed to be blandly clear. The 
freshness of the intellectual content is unvarying, for all that its relevance 
to the contemporary debate may constantly change. (Lawson-Tancred 
1991: xi) 
 
A similar claim might be made for works about Aristotle’s ideas, insofar as they 
partake of the master’s rigor and logic. But though such translating work is 
rewarding, it has never been easy. 
One of the controversies that has bedeviled the translators of Aristotle ever 
since the Middle Ages is the question of how to translate his technical terms. 
Leonardo Bruni, called Aretino, in his little treatise De interpretatione recta 
(1420 ca.), discusses all the basic issues of translation and pays particular 
attention to the problems inherent in translating Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics. 
He especially objects to the use of borrowings from Greek in the Latin 
translations (such coinages as aristocratia, democratia, oligarchia, politia). And 
he exclaims: “Quid de verbis in Graeco relictis dicam, quae tam multa sunt, ut 
semigraeca quaedam eius interpretatio videatur? Atqui nihil graece dictum est, 
quod latine dici non possit!” (quoted in Folena 1994: 62).1  
 
                                                          
1 “What should I say about the words left in Greek, which are so many that some 
translations of him seem half-Greek? And yet nothing is said in Greek which cannot 
be said in Latin!” (original translation). 
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Bruni’s battle, however, seems to have been in vain. The borrowings from 
Greek eventually passed from Latin into all the modern languages, which would 
be much the poorer without them. But the specific problem of translating 
Aristotle’s words remains. Though theoretically it is true, as Bruni says, that 
anything that can be said in Greek can also be said in Latin (or English or 
French or any other language), still there are terms in Aristotle’s works that 
seem hardly translatable without a long paraphrase or explanation, or without 
simply giving the modern term a new meaning to bring it as close as possible to 
the original meaning of Aristotle’s expression.2 This is the case, for example, of 
eudaimonia, usually translated as “happiness”, although the two concepts can be 
made to overlap only by assigning Aristotle’s conception to the English word, 
adding explanatory footnotes where necessary, and in effect giving the familiar 
English word a foreign ring; the alternative is to use the Greek term in English, 
requiring the reader to learn a new, foreign word to correspond to a foreign 
concept. 
Both strategies have been used in Natali’s book. Natali makes frequent 
recourse to Greek words, which have the advantage of being clear labels for 
Aristotle’s concepts, and even the reader whose knowledge of Greek is rather 
limited should have little difficulty in learning to recognize the few dozen key 
terms that recur throughout the book; but the Greek terms have also been 
assigned English equivalents (corresponding to Natali’s Italian translations) that 
may alternate with the original terms. Moreover, Natali’s translations from 
Aristotle are quite literal, and more precise than elegant; in the English 
translations based on them, some revisions or additions have been made in the 
interests of clarity or readability, but the basic interpretation remains that of 
Natali. Wherever possible, the passages translated from Aristotle have also been 
checked against the original Greek texts and compared with other, published 
English translations. 
One example of the importance of Natali’s translation strategy should 
suffice. In a key passage of the Nicomachean Ethics (1144a 10, found on page 
xxx of Natali 1989), he translates to ariston as la cosa migliore, i.e. “the best 
                                                          
2 The problem has been discussed by Trevor J. Saunders, in commenting on his 
revision of T.A. Sinclair’s translation of The Politics. Speaking of Aristotle’s key 
terms, he writes (Saunders 1992: 40): “Many of these terms demand, according to 
context and subject-matter, a range of English words to translate them [...]. Now as 
soon as the translator adopts several English words for one Greek word, he may 
indeed accurately render his author’s meaning, but he will conceal the structure of 
his thought, as embedded in a particular culture; hence the reader needs to be told 
which single Greek term it is that lies behind the range of English terms. On the 
other hand, always to use the same English word for the same Greek word denies 
the Greek author flexibility of usage, and in any case leads to distinctly weird 
English. ” 
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thing”, whereas Rackham (Aristotle 1934: 369) uses the much more loaded 
expression “the Supreme Good” (those capital letters are eloquent!). Rackham’s 
translation is already a clear interpretation, while Natali renders the passage 
more problematical and less categorical, opening it up to alternative readings. 
But let us return to the delucidation of Aristotle’s words. Some knowledge 
of ancient Greek is necessary in order to understand Aristotle’s philosophy, 
since his ideas and concepts are necessarily expressed in and by the words he 
uses, and these words often have connotations or even denotations that have no 
direct equivalent in modern English or, indeed, in any modern language. 
Therefore a discussion of Aristotle’s philosophy inevitably involves a 
delucidation of his terms; viceversa, a clarification of his terms serves as an 
introduction to some of his key concepts. 
****** 
The Greek term phronesis is usually translated as “practical wisdom”, and 
sophia as “theoretical wisdom”, though Joachim (1951: 13) also uses the terms 
“practical science” and “practical knowledge” for phronesis. Later on, he 
comments: 
 
‘Wisdom’ will serve as a translation for phronesis, but there is no English 
equivalent for sophia. ‘Philosophy’ represents rather the science of the 
philosopher than his eixis or state of mind. (Joachim 1951: 189) 
 
He then proposes the curious translations “speculative genius” for sophia and 
“practical (political, moral) genius” for phronesis (techne being “creative or 
productive genius”) (Joachim 1951: 189-190), but none of these translations is 
reproduced in his Greek-English index. In this book I have usually preferred to 
use, for phronesis, the literal translation of Natali’s expression, sapere pratico, 
i.e. “practical knowledge”. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, the 
translation of phronesis as “practical knowledge” rather than “practical wisdom” 
makes clear its logical connection with scientific knowledge. As Natali points 
out, there are many points of similarity between Aristotle’s treatment of ethics 
and his theory of knowledge in general; even the form of the practical syllogism 
is modelled on that of the more rigorous type of scientific syllogism. It is, 
however, no less an application of reasoning and logic, in this case to actions 
and habits. The whole thrust of Aristotle’s treatise is that it is possible to achieve 
a certain (albeit approximate) knowledge of practical ethics, which can serve as 
the basis for correct choices and, ultimately, for a wise mode of living.  
From a strictly linguistic point of view, knowledge (sapere) and wisdom 
(saggezza, sapienza) are very closely related in the Italian language, as all these 
words derive from the same Latin root. The fact that Italian has two words for 
“wisdom” has caused a further complication, however; Natali always uses 
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saggezza to translate phronesis and sapienza to mean sophia. Where the context 
made the meaning clear, the English version has only “wisdom”, but wherever 
necessary the appropriate adjective (“practical” or “theoretical”) has been added. 
Occasionally the Greek term has been added to the text, always in the interests 
of clarity. 
The Italian philosopher Abbagnano (1971: 762) has commented thus: 
 
To contemporary philosophers the word saggezza, like ‘sapienza’, seems 
too solemn a concept for them to stop to clarify it. Nonetheless, wisdom 
(saggezza) remains connected, for them as for the ancients, to the sphere 
of human affairs and can be said to consist of the old or new techniques 
that man has at his disposal for better conducting his life. (original 
translation) 
 
It should perhaps be pointed out that the Italian term scienza (from Latin 
scientia), used to render the Greek episteme, has been translated at times by 
“science” and at other times by “knowledge”. In Aristotle’s usage, much that he 
calls a “science” is what we would term a body of knowledge, although of 
course every science is also accumulated knowledge. If at times the use of the 
word “science” sounds peculiar to modern ears, it is sufficient to remember the 
etymology of the word (from Latin scire = to know). The concept of episteme is 
often opposed to that of doxa, “opinion”, although for Aristotle the word we 
translate as “opinion” does not necessarily imply any pejorative connotations. 
Very often, indeed, he starts his ethical arguments with a discussion of common 
opinions, which may even be part of the traditional wisdom. 
One important concept is that of techne, which is variously translated as 
“art”, “craft”, or “technique”. It is basically any ‘productive activity’; the 
sculptor makes a sculpture, the joiner makes a table, the tailor makes a coat, etc. 
Sometimes the object produced may be less concrete, as in the case of the poet, 
who produces a poem (a series of verbal expressions). Or it may even be 
something difficult to define, as when a doctor produces a ‘state of health’. Here 
the result of the productive activity is not always easy to observe; yet medicine 
is a techne, and it does produce results. It is not a science in the theoretical 
sense, since its aim is not to discover truth but to apply knowledge to produce 
practical results. It is a “technique”, founded on knowledge, aiming at solving 
practical problems. It is a way of doing things, which may also involve a certain 
technology. Natali translates techne by the Italian word tecnica, which means 
both “technique” and “technology”, as well as “technical knowledge”. There is 
no English word that covers all these meanings simultaneously; thus the 
translator has had to choose now one equivalent, now another, deciding in each 
case which meaning seemed to be paramount in the context. 
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Another translation problem regards the correct equivalent for what Natali 
calls the giusto mezzo (in French juste milieu, cf. Gauthier 1967), literally the 
“right mean”. This expression is not attested in English usage, so far as I know; 
two other expressions, “the golden mean” and “the happy medium”, are found. I 
have used the expression “the golden mean” only occasionally, as it derives 
from Horace’s aurea mediocritas, not directly from Aristotle. Likewise, I have 
seldom used the traditional English expression “the happy medium”. The usual 
translation here is simply “mean”, although “golden mean” is sometimes used to 
avoid confusion in passages where the discussion also regards the distinction 
between “means” and “ends”. It is unfortunate that English uses two such 
similar words to indicate concepts that are so different (Italian uses the same 
word, mezzo, which is why Natali adds the adjective giusto to identify the 
concept of meson). The Greek word telos causes, instead, no particular problem; 
it is usually translated as “end”, though sometimes the word “aim” is used. The 
concept, in any case, is clear. 
The doctrine of the mean seems to be related to the natural dichotomies 
embodied in our languages. We are accustomed to thinking of polarities in 
which one term is positive and the other is negative – “good” vs. “bad”, “right” 
vs. “wrong”. This leads us to think that what is “good” or “right” is an extreme, 
an absolute quality. But Aristotle starts from other pairs of opposites, in which 
both extremes are equally bad. A common example of this is the opposition 
between “hot” and “cold”, both of which extremes are to be avoided, in favor of 
a moderate, or mean, temperature. It is a peculiarity of language that very often 
there is no obvious term for the median characteristic; “rashness” and 
“cowardice” are clearly both “bad”, but what do we call “the right amount of 
fear”? There seems to be no word for it, though the concept is clear enough. 
Aristotle faces this difficulty on several occasions. 
****** 
In this translation I have generally used the traditional translation of arete as 
“virtue” (Natali uses the term virtù), although there are times when it must be 
replaced by the term “excellence”. The arete of anything is simply its proper or 
peculiar excellence; thus the excellence proper to the human soul may be called 
“virtue”. Aristotle further distinguishes between moral and intellectual virtues, 
using the term “virtue” for the latter term in a way that strikes us as unusual. 
Although the expression is frequently found in translations of Aristotle, it may 
help to clarify matters if we think of “intellectual virtue” as being “intellectual 
excellence”.  
As Guthrie (1960) points out, arete is an eixis, or habitual state. Aristotle 
himself, in the Metaphysics (1022b 10ff.), defines this as 
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a state or disposition, being well or ill disposed, and that either with 
regard to itself or in relation to something else; for example, health is a 
state of being, since it is such a disposition. 
 
Another term that is defined by Aristotle is aitia, “cause”, which may be of 
four kinds: (1) “the material constituent from which a thing comes to be”; (2) 
the “form or pattern of a thing”; (3) the “agent whereby a change or state of rest 
is first produced”; and (4) the “end, or the wherefor” (Metaphysics, 1013a 
27ff.). These, of course, are Aristotle’s famous four causes (material, formal, 
efficient and final), which are taken for granted throughout his discussion of 
ethics (although in ethical terms he deals mainly with efficient and final causes). 
As the term teleion recurs frequently in Aristotle’s ethical discussions 
(where he speaks of “complete virtue” and a “complete life”) it may be useful to 
give here Aristotle’s own definition of it: 
 
Thus, things are complete which in their own kind are perfected in these 
various ways: because in goodness they either lack nothing or cannot be 
excelled or have nothing proper to them outside of them; and, in general, 
because they cannot be excelled in their own kind or have nothing proper 
to it outside of them. (Metaphysics, 1021b 31ff.) 
 
To finish this excursus through Aristotle’s words, let us see what he has to 
say about arche (in Latin principium, in Italian principio), rendered in English 
sometimes by “principle” and sometimes by “starting-point”. Aristotle 
distinguishes six different meanings: (1) the “first point whence a thing’s 
movement proceeds”; (2) the “point whence a thing develops best”; (3) the 
“guiding part of any process”; (4) the “external source whence a process or 
movement has developed”; (5) the “decisive factor which moves whatever is 
moved or changes whatever is changed”; and (6) “a principle of knowledge, the 
basic idea for understanding any body of knowledge: such as, the premises of 
proof. [...] What all beginnings have in common is that they are points of 
departure either for being, or becoming, or knowing” (Metaphysics, 1012b 
32ff.). Emanuele Severino (1995: 28) glosses the term as meaning variously 
“center of radiation”, “dominant point”, “principle” and “origin” (original 
translation); it was used by philosophers long before Aristotle but plays a key 
role in Aristotle’s thought, though – as can be seen – no single translation does 
full justice to the term. 
****** 
One problem regards the translation of the Italian word uomo and the generic 
use of masculine pronouns. The most obvious and usual translation of uomo is 
“man” which, like its Italian equivalent, can refer both to a male human being 
and to human beings in general. This translation has frequently been used in this 
Gerald Parks 8 
text, despite certain misgivings which have led to its being sometimes replaced 
by other terms, such as “people” or “human beings”. The traditional term has, 
however, been accepted as reflecting also Aristotle’s views on the matter, since 
clearly his lectures and writings were intended for an exclusively male audience, 
though one could argue that today his doctrines are equally relevant to both 
sexes. Likewise, the generic “he” has been used as a matter of convenience, 
though sometimes sentences have been rewritten in the plural form with “they”. 
Very often Italian manages to avoid the problem completely because in that 
language it is not necessary to express personal pronouns in the subject form 
and the possessive adjective “suo” may mean indifferently “his, her or its”. (It 
might be felt that the Italian uomo is less offensive than “man”, deriving as it 
does from the Latin homo, human being, and not from vir, but by now the 
Italian term has come to have the meanings and connotations of both Latin 
words.)  
****** 
Aristotle is not only careful in his use of technical or semi-technical terms; he 
also pays great attention to language in general, even quoting poetry, idioms and 
common expressions to illustrate the meaning of words, just as a modern 
analytical philosopher might do. And in general he keeps close to the ordinary 
meanings of words, as in his discussions of the virtues. As Greenwood (1973: 
64) points out, “Aristotle has all the ordinary Greek thinker’s reverence for 
language as a divine creation and a guide to reality.” The only cases where he 
seems to depart from ordinary usage are in his philosohical attempts to define 
and systematize the concepts of “virtue” and “happiness”. 
Heidegger and Cristin 
Similar problems arise in the translation of Heidegger’s philosophy which, like 
Aristotle’s, is very closely linked to his idiosyncratic use of words. No one can 
fully understand Heidegger’s thought without some knowledge of the key 
German words he uses and the meanings he attaches to them. Therefore, in 
translating Renato Cristin’s book Heidegger e Leibniz: Il sentiero e la ragione 
from Italian into English, the German words have frequently been left in their 
original form. Often too, however, they have been translated, and the translation 
has aimed to be as accurate and consistent as possible. 
However, Cristin’s text, much more than Natali’s, makes use of a literary 
language and even poetical devices to express meanings that often take the form 
of images and intuitions. This aspect of the text can be illustrated by the 
following passage (Cristin 1990: 57-58). 
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Il sentiero dell’essere conduce, quindi, in un ritiro e un ritorno continui, 
dal fondamento all’abisso e da questo al puro Aperto dell’essere. Il 
fondamento si inserisce in una trama ontologica che lo lega alla sua 
negazione, al baratro, in una armonia dinamica tra offerta del terreno 
stabile e mancanza di qualsiasi appoggio, tra esposizione e sottrazione 
del fondo. La ragione è resa precaria, il fondamento è cioè abisso nella 
misura in cui non costituisce un substrato concettuale e categoriale sul 
quale erigere l’edificio della metafisica, ma fa crollare e precipitare ogni 
architettonica filosofica nell’incertezza e nell’instabilità in cui l’essere si 
dona ritraendosi. I bagliori del precipizio sono dunque i riflessi della 
terrestrità del fondamento: pensare la ragione e la causa implica dunque 
immergersi nell’esplorazione dell’abisso. 
 
This passage is highly metaphorical; even the technical terms are metaphors 
(fondamento, abisso, sentiero, precipizio). The exposition does not proceed by a 
chain of logical reasoning, but by a series of intuitive, metaphorical statements. 
The sentences are carefully constructed and have a literary ring. Sometimes 
devices such as alliteration and assonance are used for greater effect (ritiro-
ritorno). Here the translator must pay close attention to the rich, suggestive 
texture of the writing.  
The translation follows (Cristin 1998: 49): 
 
The pathway of Being therefore leads to a continual retreat and return, 
from the foundation to the abyss and from the latter to the pure Open of 
Being. The foundation is inserted into an ontological plot that links it to 
its negation, to the chasm, in a dynamic harmony between the provision 
of solid ground and the lack of any footing at all, between the exposure 
and the suppression of the ground. Reason is rendered precarious; the 
foundation is the abyss to the extent that it is not a conceptual and 
categorial substratum on which to erect the edifice of metaphysics. 
Indeed, it causes every philosophical construction to collapse and fall 
headlong into the uncertainty and instability in which Being offers itself 
by withdrawing itself. The gleaming of the precipice is therefore the 
reflection of the earthliness of the foundation: to think reason and causes 
therefore means to immerse oneself in the exploration of the abyss. 
 
The translation stays quite close to the structure of the original text and 
reproduces its metaphors, even recreating equivalent patterns of alliteration 
(e.g., retreat-return). The reader is expected to respond to the metaphors by 
meditating on their deeper meaning. 
The purpose of this short paper has been to point out some of the problems 
encountered in the translation of philosophical texts from one language into 
another. Two types of problems have been discussed: the thorny question of 
terminology, and the sometimes literary nature of the text. It goes without 
saying that the translator of such texts must not only have an excellent command 
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of both languages involved, but must also be well informed about the 
philosophers he or she is dealing with. It is to be expected that reading and 
research will take up almost as much time as the actual translation work. Such 
research may never be fully remunerated, but the learning involved is its own 
reward, and the end result of such challenging translation work may prove to be 
extremely gratifying. 
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